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In the 1950s we worried about the Cold War and the
danger of nuclear accidents. For the 1960s the main
agenda item was development in the Third World. The
economic crises of the I 970s made these problems and
concerns come together, and the 1980s present us with
the twin problems of militarisation and development.
Exacerbated by the economic, social and political
problems experienced by the North, development and
peace have become foci of attention for scholars,
politicians aod administrators, and for the general
public.
From the mid-1970s a series of international reports
has íddressed various aspects of this linkage. The first
of these, North-South, under the Chairmanship of the
former West German Chancellor, Willy Brandt,
outlined a global strategy for survival. In Brandt's
intl )duction it was stressed that resources used for
military purposes could be used instead to solve the
development problems of the Third World: for
example, 0.5 per cent of one year's world military
expenditure could pay for all the farm equipment
needed to increase food production and approach self-
sufficiency in food deficit low-income countries by
1990 [Report of the Independent Commission on
International Development Issues 1980: 13-15]. This
proposal, though not part of the report proper, is
illustrative of its underlying conception. Transfer of
resources from the rich countries (the industrialised
West) and the surplus producing countries (OPEC) to
the poor countries in the Third World is the answer.
Survival is the main theme and economic survival
problems are at the centre of the report's recom-
mendations. Survival is also the reduction of conflict.
By accommodating the concerns of the Third World
as expressed in their demands for a New International
Economic Order (NIEO) further conflict between
North and South is reduced. 1f Third World countries
get better prices for their raw materials, better access
to the markets of the industrialised countries, and a
better position in international decision-making, the
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chances of common survival are improved. Further-
more, some of the problems that beleaguer all
countries today can only be solved through concerted
action. The protection of the environment, the
reduction of the dangers and costs inherent in the arms
race are problems that can only be dealt with by the
entire international community.
These problems were described and analysed in detail
in the report, but the proposals that were agreed upon
as a consequence of the description of the problem
were in reality very limited in scope, detail, and effect.
For example, industrial restructuring in the
industrialised countries is presented as one of the
things that needs to be done, but the specific proposals
only say that adjustment programmes should be
pursued.
The report's recommendations concerning disarma-
ment and development [ibid: 117-25, 284] are equally
vague. They talk about the need to educate the public;
the development of a more comprehensive under-
standing of security, including its non-military
aspects; international agreements to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons; the need to build
upon the process of détente by undertaking
negotiations to get the arms race under control; an
enlarged role for the United Nations; and a globally
respected peace-keeping mechanism. More specifically,
the report proposes an international tax on the arms
trade to be used for development; disclosure by
governments of their arms exports and transfers of
military technology; and negotiated limits on the arms
trade, especially in areas of conflict and tension.
The follow-up report, Common Crisis, restated many
of the previous proposals, underlining that very little
of what the original report advocated had been
achieved: 'The North-South dialogue remains much
where it was when the Commission reported. Some
modest steps forward have been taken. And some
backwards. Meanwhile the world economy continues
its dangerous downward slide, and the desperate
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situation of many developing countries finds no new
hope or relief' [Brandt Commission 1983:12]. It went
on to note the complete failure of the 1982 UN Special
Session on Disarmament, as well as the upsurge in
world military spending [ibid:37-8]. In his introduction
Willy Brandt was even more explicit, arguing that only
an end to the arms race would provide a change to 'end
the grim political and economic confusion engulfing
our societies everywhere'. In his view the failure to
respond to the crisis was 'not primarily the lack of
technical solutions . . but the lack of a clearly and
broadly reflected awareness of the current realities and
dangers, and an absence of the political will necessary
to meet the real problems' [ibid:8].
However, another reason the reports failed to produce
results was the nature of their own diagnoses and
recommendations. Their basic philosophy is 'some-
thing for everybody', and they urge common action
and negotiation as the way to solve problems.
Common interests should motivate this type of action,
and the main goal of the reports was to help create a
political consensus around the need for a common
international effort to solve global problems.
The second Brandt report, however, gave less
attention to the relationship between disarmament
and development. Instead this fell within the terms of
reference of a new Commission on Common Security,
headed by the Swedish Social Democratic leader (now
Prime Minister) Olof Palme, whose membership
overlapped (in the persons of Palme himself, Shridath
Ramphal and Haruki Mon) with the Brandt
Commission. Whereas the latter 'concentrated its
work on economic matters, the new Commission'.
'will seek to complement that broad overview of
global issues by concentrating on security and
disarmament measures that can contribute to peace in
the 1980s and beyond' (Report of the Independent
Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues
1982).
The Commission's central theme is that 'states can no
longer seek security at each other's expense . . . A
doctrine of common security must replace the present
expedient of deterrence through armaments' [ibid:
139]. Much of the report is given over to discussion of
nuclear disarmament, East-West relations and quali-
tative arms control. However, it then goes on to
discuss the role that the United Nations could play in
creating a collective security system which would be
based on 'political agreement and partnership
between the permanent members of the Security
Council and the Third World countries' [ibid: 164] and
would be primarily concerned with the resolution of
Third World conflicts. Through this system it might be
possible to prevent the escalation into major wars of
local conflicts, border wars and ethnically based
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clashes. Enhancing collective security means reacti-
vating the security system originally built into the UN
Charter, the creation of a UN army, the establishment
of Helsinki-type regional security accords in the Third
World, etc.
The Palme report is based on a state-centric view of the
world, and its basis for analysis is the traditional
security dilemma. All states seek national security
through the acquisition of weapons. Weapons are
equated with security. Security cannot, however, be
achieved at the expense of others, and cooperation is
necessary. All states live in an insecure world and
share a common vulnerability. No nation can escape
the threat of nuclear destruction, and both developed
and developing countries live under this threat.
Socially and economically, states have become
vulnerable too, and security must be viewed and
understood in this context, according to the report.
Only through the removal of mutual suspicion and
fear can security be achieved. Security is common, and
to create the foundation for true national security, the
international system needs to be changed, so that
cooperation instead of confrontation is the basis of the
system. In the words of the report: 'Neither physical
nor psychological security can be achieved without the
development of an international system which would
outlaw war . . .' [ibid:12].
With this as the premise, the report goes on to analyse
the threat of war. A major part of this analysis
naturally concentrates on the nature of the East-West
conflict and the specific problems and dangers in
Europe. However these East-West confrontations are
now being transferred to the Third World, and
increased conflict is the result. The report does add
that indigenous factors are a fundamental cause of
Third World conflicts. Yet the North often acts in
ways that make the resolution of such conflicts more
difficult, and supplies the increasingly advanced
weapons that make the escalation of conflict more
likely [ibid:27-3 I].
The relationship between the East-West conflict and
the conflicts in the Third World are outlined in various
ways in the report. The accelerating nuclear weapons
competition creates tension that in itself heightens the
danger of war and therefore also puts security in the
Third World at peril. Tension is also transferred to the
various regions of the Third World through an
intensified arms race and the policies of the
superpowers. The superpowers acquire bases and
military facilities on the soil of Third World countries,
and they pressure these countries to play a more active
supporting role in the Cold War. Increased regional
tension in the Third World in turns fuels the
competition between the superpowers and has adverse
effects on the prospects of building mutual trust and
reducing war.
After this survey of causes of war and its consequences
for the Third World, the report focuses on the effects
of military expenditure upon both the developed and
the developing countries {ibid:Ch4]. Its analysis of this
is thorough, being partly based on commissioned
studies by outside researchers. To states in the Third
World, the rising costs of armaments are of particular
importance. The report says that the military use of
scarce resources and skills in the developing countries
increases 'human deprivation' and 'can jeopardise
economic growth and development and thus the
foundation for lasting security' [ibid:87-81. Since the
developing countries have to import a large part of
their arms, the economic burden is even greater than in
the developed countries. Socially, military expansion
presents the developing world with 'alien lifestyles and
military cultures' that in themselves have negative
effects on the development process [ibid:86ff].
But the security problem in the Third World is not
seen merely as a reflection of the East-West
confrontation or of induced militarism. The weakness
and dependency of the developing countries in itself
generates military conflicts and tempts other states to
achieve political goals through military intervention.
It is in this connection that the report proposes a
system of collective security, UN peace keeping and
regional conflict-resolution. The responsibility for
achieving security between states is placed with the
international community and the UN. The collective
security system is mainly seen in relation to the Third
World. Whereas security in the East-West context has
to be negotiated, security in the Third World is to be
enforced through a reconstituted UN system.
Central to the analysis of the report is a perception of
development as primarily an economic process and of
armaments and militarisation as wasteful spending.
There are relatively few attempts in the report to
establish in a rigorous way the causal connections
between militarisation and development. The stress is
on conflict avoidance through regulation of conflicts.
A new international regime is needed, and here the
burdens and the benefits must be evenly distributed.
'The burden of making the world safe for all (must) be
shared by all' [ibid:3].
Thus the Palme Report,just like the Brandt Report, is
premised on common interests. However there is little
or nothing in the report to translate the obvious
common interest in avoiding nuclear destruction into
a political programme that can remove the perception
of mutual threats between states. States can only
achieve security through cooperation, and this is a
readily recognised fact. But states have other goals,
and these goals often take precedence. The central
problem is how political conflicts are solved, and here
disarmament as such has little to offer.
Pan 1J World Affairs
COMMON
SECURITY
A PROGRAMME FOR DISARMAMENT
The Report of the Independent
Commission on Disarmament
and Security Issues under the
Chairmanship of Olof Palme
Introduction by
The Rt Hon. Dr Davic Owen MP
The perspective of the Palme Report is illustrated very
clearly in the illustration on the book cover. The world
is seen from above in a projection that makes the
South look much larger than it is. It is also the way that
the world is presented in the official UN symbol,
except that the world is turned 45 degrees. The
drawing of the world is surrounded by ten hands that
form a ring of cooperation between people.
Cooperation is seen as the way to shield the world
from war and insecurity.
Holding hands, however, does not solve conflicts of
interest. Common security can only be achieved
through the resolution of existing fundamental
conflicts. How that is done is not addressed in the
Palme report. The more than 30 proposals contained
in the report have received scant attention since they
were published in 1982. The only proposal that has
been met with some public interest is the proposal for a
battlefield-nuclear-weapon-free zone in Europe. This
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had been widely discussed internationally; but the
prospects for its implementation seem very dim.
Of the many recommendations of the report only a
minority deal with the Third World. These include
broader adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
and greater international control over sensitive parts
of the nuclear fuel-cycle. The report also proposes
negotiations among supplier states to restrict the flow
of arms to the Third World, particularly to regions
where there are severe political tensions; and
negotiations among recipients to regulate their
acquisition of arms and prevent local arms races.
There is little in the report, however, that directly
addresses the connection between security and
development, except perhaps the idea of promoting
periodic Regional Conferences on Security and
Cooporation à la mode Helsinki (CSCE) in the various
Third World regions. These could provide a
framework for cooperation, not only on security but
also on economic, social and cultural issues. They
could also establish the infrastructure for regional
zones of peace and nuclear-weapons-free zones, both
of which are endorsed by the report.
The report stresses that economic cooperation
between the participating states in these regional
security talks is a necessary foundátion for the
development of common perceptions of security
interests and concerns. Economic development and
cooperation is seen as a prerequisite for the attainment
of security in the Third World: 'Without economic
recovery there is no hope for common security - for
the common prosperity which is the basis of security
itself' [ibid:961. However, the development perspective
of the report is based on very conventional thinking.
The development problem in the Third World is seen
as mainly a question of financial resources.
Consequently, the task at hand is to divert resources
from wasteful use on armaments and into productive
use for development. Thus the Palme Report proposes
that specific national plans are devised in the
developed countries and in the rich OPEC countries to
release resources from their defence budgets which can
be reallocated to development assistance; and that
these be complemented by reductions in the military
spending of the developing countries themselves
[ibid: 172-4].
As critics of the Palme Report have pointed out, these
proposals have little bearing on national policy
processes. They do not address the problem of military
doctrine, or of the bureaucratic and industrial
interests in weapons production. There is an overall
focus on multilateral measures that makes it very
difficult to translate the proposals into national
policies for action and change [Galtung 1984:138-45].
This underlying confidence in international negotia-
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dons and multilateral solutions channelled through
the UN seems misplaced at a time when the national
solutions and problems are at the forefront of leaders'
attention everywhere. Because it fails to address
specific interests, the impact of the Palme commission
has been limited. The concentration of the report on
the international and multilateral levels has in a sense
made it easier to ignore its proposals at the national
level of decision making. There is no need for
individual governments to worry about a programme
that can only be enacted when all the others have
agreed to it.
The Palme Report details the economic and social
consequences of military spending. But it does not
adequately address how development and disarmament
would be linked as political processes. The proposals
do not posit a realistic way forward. One reason is that
the report provides insufficient intellectual or political
foundation for understanding the link between the
security and development problems of individual
Third World countries and the driving forces behind
the East-West confrontation.
In a study prepared for the United Nations (called the
Thorsson Report after Inga Thorsson, the chairperson
of the expert group [United Nations 1981]) the
analysis of these connections and their consequences is
more centrally placed. And like the Palme Report it is
based on the findings of a number of commissioned
studies by outside researchers. This report stresses that
previous studies had tended to refrain from coupling
disarmament and development, because this might
lead to a situation where neither was achieved. The
report argues that this is no longer a relevant
consideration. There is tremendous pressure on the
scarce resources that governments control, which
means that increases in expenditure in one area usually
necessitate cuts in another. Increases in development
assistance therefore can no longer be achieved in
isolation. Furthermore, international negotiations on
development issues and negotiations between super-
powers on arms control are interrelated. The present
Cold War situation makes it very difficult to get
negotiations going on the NIEO. Consequently the
two sets of problems now have to be studied together.
The arms race, according to the report, directly
reduces the security of the participating states, and
disarmament will tend to increase their security.
Development has to be seen both as a need for
continuing economic growth and as an opportunity
and responsibility for everybody to participate fully in
the economic and social processes and their ensuing
results [ibid: 163].
The coupling between security and development is
primarily seen in terms of their mutual economic
interdependence: meaning that a continuing arms race
will create a vicious circle of confrontation, distrust,
economic nationalism and protectionism and in the
end reduce the policy options available to all parties.
Besides highlighting the general negative effects which
high armament expenditure has on the global
economy, the report concentrates on showing the
special burden that these expenditures entail for Third
World countries. It cites a number of the detailed
empirical studies carried out on behalf of the expert
group, showing among other things that countries
with high military expenditures have lower levels of
investment and a greater tax burden than other
countries; that military spending has limited positive
spin-offs; that arms imports divert scarce foreign
exchange and entail political as well as economic costs
for the recipients, etc. [ibid:92-4j.
On the basis of an input-output model of the world
economy submitted to the expert group, the report
suggests that simultaneous cuts in military spending
by both the developed and the developing countries
could produce substantial economic benefits ibid:97-
100]. Gradual cuts in the share of military outlays
relative to GNP, reducing military spending to around
65 per cent of what it would have been if the arms race
continued at the present level, would result in a world
GNP 3.7 per cent higher than would otherwise have
been projected. More important, on the assumption
that the relatively wealthy countries transferred a
fraction of the savings generated by their military cuts
to development assistance, this could substantially
increase the capital stock, industrial employment and
per capita GNP of the poorer developing countries
compared with the base (continuing arms race) level:
the per capita GNP increases would range between
17 per cent (for resource-poor Latin America) and
146 percent (for the arid regions of Africa). However,
as the report itself admits, the model is 'highly
aggregative, somewhat static and its detailed results
are dependent upon a number of explicit and implicit
assumptions. Some of these can be easily questioned'
[ibid:99]. Another empirical analysis of the same
problem [Duchin 1982] concludes, much less
optimistically, that transfers of this type would only
marginally increase the standard of living of the poor
countries.
The report further argues that cuts in military
spending need not produce unemployment in the
industrialised countries. The direct job losses would
not affect a large proportion of the labour force and
would be more than offset by the gains generated by
increased growth - especially if the military
reductions were combined with a reduction in
protectionism and consequent gains in North-South
trade [UN 1981].
After a discussion of the problem of conversion from
military production by the major military producers
(discussed in other contributions to this Bulletin) and
of possible institutional mechanisms for the transfer of
resources from military spending to development
assistance [ibid: Ch 5 and 6], the report concludes with
a number of proposals for action. These are primarily
directed to states and governments asking them to
carry out detailed assessments of the costs of their
military activities, the possible benefits of a
reallocation of military resources to other purposes
and of the practicability of conversion. The report also
proposes an intensified campaign for educating the
public on peace and development, to be orchestrated
by the UN. And it proposes that the UN should
investigate the French government's proposal to
create an international disarmament fund for
development, financed either by a levy on armament
or by a disarmament dividend financed by the
budgeting savings resulting from the implementation
of disarmament measures. Versions of this proposal
are still under negotiation internationally (e.g. in
Stockholm at the Conference on Confidence and
Security-building Measures and Disarmament in
Europe).
The Thorsson Report suffers from the same defects as
the other reports, despite its sharper focus on the
relationship between disarmament and development.
It is based on a conception of security that is valid in
principle, but not adhered to by most individual
nation states. The report argues that security is much
broader than military security, with economic and
social aspects placed at the forefront. In the security
policy of states the perception of threats and of the
intentions of adversary states is, however, the
determining factor. Defining security in the way that
the Thorsson Report does may therefore be
counterproductive, if the objective is to ensure an
impact on state policy. The intermediate steps between
common goals and short term interests need to be
spelled out much more clearly.
The concept of development in the report is equally
broad and hard to apply. Development is defined as
sustained economic growth with the opportunity and
responsibility for full participation. The result should
be profound economic and social changes in society
and a universal share in the benefits of economic
growth. However, unless this conception of develop-
ment is translated into policy it will have little
relevance or impact.
In sum, the main suggestions in all three of the reports
under circulation are for more studies, reports and
funds to be created. Besides an appeal to everybody's
long term interests there is little to motivate spending
time and money on this. There is nothing in the reports
27
on how to translate the studies into a practical strategy
for change. Educating the public, governments and
the international community is an impossible task
unless you address interests that people and states
have - here and now.
One cannot deny. however, that the three reports are
of major international significance and address
themselves to the long term interests of all of us. They
point to many mistaken beliefs that float around in
political discussion, and present a platform for
discussing the interrelations between North-South
and East-West problems. But they are not, nor can
they be, an adequate foundation for action to change
these systems. As a result of their terms of reference,
they address long term global interests; which in the
real world tend to be overshadowed by the short term
national interests of particular states, groups and
classes.
The fundamental problem of coupling such interests
to common global interests is still unresolved. It is to
be hoped that is where the next international report
will start.
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